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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between senate malapportionment and the allocation of
the US federal budget to the states during the period 1978-2002. A substantial literature
originating from the inuential paper by Atlas et al. (1995), using a within estimation
methodology nds that small and overrepresented states get signicantly larger shares
of federal funds. Revisiting the econometric specication used by the current empiri-
cal research, we show that the number of senators percapita is inappropriate to capture
malapportionement in regressions using broad federal programs, and that the results ob-
tained with this indicator are extremely non-robust to reasonable specication changes.
In particular, senators percapita have a signicant impact on federal spending only in re-
gressions containing state xed e¤ects. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients estimated using the
within methodology are statistically di¤erent across states and, therefore, cannot be used
to assess spending di¤erentials between states. The magnitude and signicance of those
coe¢ cients suggest a within state-specic inverse relationship between broad spending
categories and population which is not systematically related to the size of the states and
seems more compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.
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The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being ev-
idently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and
the small States, does not call for much discussion. (Madison 1788)
1 Introduction
The US constitution mandates a di¤erent type of representation for federal states in the two
branches of Congress. Members of the House are assigned proportionally to population and
regularly reapportioned in response to demographic changes. In the Senate, the principle of
equal representation prescribes that each state must be represented by two senators. In the
intent of the founding fathers of the US constitution, the double representation principle should
balance the interests of the small and big states. The combination of proportional and equal
representation, together with the House proposal power on budgetary matters, should grant
adequate consideration to the interests of all states, independently of their population size.1
In fact, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) provide a formal model showing how the attribution of
proposal power to the lower house may indeed counterbalance the malapportionment in the
upper house leading to an equal distribution of per-capita government expenditure.2
Despite the proclaimed virtues of the double representation system, the current empirical
literature provides large support for the existence of a small state advantage in the allocation
of the US federal budget.3 In particular, the pioneering and very inuential work of Atlas
et al. (1995) (henceforth AGHZ), analyzing biennial data between 1972 and 1990, nds a
strongly signicant relationship between per-capita representation in the US House and Senate
and per-capita federal spending. They introduce in the empirical literature a measure of state
1In relation to the risk of overrepresentation of the small states, Madison writes: The large States, therefore,
who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and
augmentations mutually conditions of each other; (...) These considerations seem to a¤ord ample security
on this subject (...) Admitting, however, that they should all be insu¢ cient to subdue the unjust policy of
the smaller States, or their predominant inuence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible
resource still remains with the larger States(...) . The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they
alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse (...)
(Madison 1788). For a critical view on Senate representation in the US constitution see Dahl (2002).
2See Knight (2005) for an empirical investigation of the impact of the proposal power of individual congres-
sional representatives, such as committee members, over spending at the district level.
3The actual process through which Senate overrepresentation could generate a bias in federal budget allo-
cation might be related to the process of congressional bargaining. Since less funds are necessary to obtain the
same increase in percapita expenditure in a smaller than in a larger state, senators who need to build winning
coalitions to bring federal spending to their constituents will typically ask smaller states to enter the coalition
to minimize the cost of buying political allies (Lee (1998); Knight (2004)).
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overrepresentation (the number of representatives per capita) which has become very common
and has inspired a number of subsequent works. Lee (1998), using Bickers and Stein (1991)
data on domestic outlays from 1983 to 1990, nds evidence of overspending in small states
for non-discretionary distributive programmes that are allocated via formulas determined by
the Congress. Hoover and Pecorino (2005), considering a di¤erent time period (1983-1999)
and a broad range of spending aggregates, nd that states representation in the Senate is
positively related with total per-capita outlays as well as with procurement, grants, wages and
pensions.4 Finally, Knight (2004) does not nd strong e¤ects of Senate overrepresentation on
aggregate spending, although he does on earmarked projects: the e¤ect is particularly strong if
the earmark comes from the Senate.5 Hauk and Wacziag (2007), using the authorizations from
the 2005 Highway Bill, conrm the existence of an overrepresentation e¤ect on transportation
earmarks.
The evidence provided by existing studies rises some fundamental questions about the US
bicameralism. According to the estimates of AGHZ, in 1990 the di¤erence in total real per-
capita spending due to overrepresentation between the most overrepresented (Wyoming) and
the most under-represented (California) states is equivalent to approximately one third of the
total spending of Wyoming.6 The estimated coe¢ cients of senators percapita found from other
empirical studies point to similar magnitudes (Wright (1974); Wallis (1998); Larcinese et al.
(2006)).
In this paper we reconsider the hypothesis that small states receive more federal funds and
argue that the results of previous empirical research are extremely non-robust to specication
changes. We illustrate a number of ndings that are at odds with the idea that small states
have an advantage in spending allocation. First of all, by using the same indicator of AGHZ,
we nd no evidence of a bias in favor of small states in cross section regressions.7 Only when
considering within-state variation, the number of senators per capita becomes statistically sig-
nicant.8 The second puzzling result is that the e¤ects of overrepresentation are particularly
strong on spending aggregates, such as direct payments to individuals,9 that are less politically
4They, however, nd a negative impact of House representation.
5At district level, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) analyze the e¤ect of unequal representation prior to 1960 and
the equalizing impact on state transfers to counties following the court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s.
6AGHZ estimate that the di¤erence is equal to 1148$ in 1990 dollars.
7This is consistent with previous ndings by Lee (1998) and Knight (2004).
8Previous studies that nd a strong small state advantage all use xed e¤ects models. Recent examples are
Hoover and Pecorino (2005) and Larcinese et al. (2006).
9Direct payment to individuals include mainly entitlement programs such as social security, retirement
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manipulable at the state level.10 Third, if we omit the AGHZ indicator from our regressions and
analyze the estimated xed e¤ects (which should then contain the overrepresentation e¤ect) we
discover that, after controlling for socio-demograc indicators, the larger states receive more
funds than the average.
Building on these ndings, we show that the AGHZ indicator does not identify the e¤ect of
malapportionment: this remains at the moment a fundamentally unidentiable e¤ect, at least
on large spending aggregates. The coe¢ cient of senators per capita should represent, in the
interpretation of AGHZ, a constant relationship between overrepresentation and the spending
received by each state. We show that this relationship is not constant across states and that
the equations estimated by most empirical researchers impose therefore a restriction which is
not supported by a standard F-test. This means that equalizing the number of senators per
capita, and controlling for other relevant socioeconomic variables, would not be su¢ cient to
eliminate spending di¤erentials: these are, therefore, independent of both overrepresentation
and observable socioeconomic factors. What the current literature interprets as the e¤ect of
malapportionment may be instead the consequence of di¤erent state specic trends in federal
spending: this would explain why the e¤ect is only found in xed e¤ects models.
Our results are compatible with behavioural incrementalist theories of budgeting (Wil-
davsky 1964), which claim the current spending to be largely predetermined by past budget
allocation. The inertia in the budget process implies that the growth (decrease) in population
is typically not compensated by a proportional increment (decrease) in federal spending, thus
determining a decrease in spending per-capita in states with a fast-growing population and an
increase in states where the population decreases or grows slowly. In fact, we nd a remarkable
inverse pattern between per-capita expenditure and population growth rates which has noth-
ing to do with a state being large or small. All together, our results suggest that the inverse
relationship between federal spending and population found by previous studies using broad
spending categories hides an important heterogeneity of patterns at state level which does not
provide evidence on small statesadvantage in the federal budget allocation.11
benets and health care programs.
10See Atlas et al. (1995) and Hoover and Pecorino (2005).
11Panel studies using very specic spending aggregates might not be a¤ected by those shortcomings as long as
the programs analyzed may be less likely to display the state-specic relationship with senators percapita that
we nd for large spending aggregates. However, our analysis suggests that a careful investigation is necessary
to obtain a correct interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients in xed e¤ect type regressions.
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2 Some puzzling results
Population size varies considerably across US states and so does per-capita Senate represen-
tation. Table 1 reports an index of Senate and House overrepresentation by state during the
period 1978-2002. Under or overrepresentation is determined by comparison with a fair rep-
resentation given by the ratio between the total members of the House (or Senate) and the
total US population in a given year.12 States are ordered by average population in the period
1978-2002 (starting with the smallest) and obviously smaller states are overrepresented in the
Senate. In the House, however, this phenomenon is negligible and not correlated with the
population size of a state. Table 1 also reports average federal spending per capita by state in
the period considered, showing that there is no clear pattern linking Senate overrepresentation
and spending. This can be seen graphically in Figure 1, where the states are ordered along
the horizontal axis according to their average population in the period considered, while on the
vertical axis we report average per capita outlays.
A well established procedure introduced by AGHZ to estimate the e¤ect of overrepresen-
tation is to regress federal outlays on per capita representation (i.e. the ratio of the number
of House or Senate members over the population, per state). AGHZ nd a positive impact on
spending of per capita representation in both the Senate and the House. However, the e¤ect
of the House has never been conrmed by any of the subsequent studies. This should not be
surprising since the number of House representatives is readjusted periodically in accordance
with demographic changes. Indeed, looking at Table 1, there is no clear pattern in the rela-
tionship between House representation and the malapportionment index. For this reason, in
the following we will focus on the Senate. All our estimations have been replicated by also in-
cluding House representatives per capita, with two main conclusions.13 First, all the results we
nd on Senate overrepresentations are not a¤ected by the introduction of House representatives
percapita. Second, consistently with other studies, the coe¢ cient of House representatives per
capita is sometimes positive, more often negative, and never statistically signicant at any ac-
12More specically, dene Nst as the population of state s in year t and USpopt as the total US population
(in the 48 states considered) in year t. Then the overrepresentation index in year t for the Senate is given by
2
Nst
= 96USpopt =
USpopt
48Nst ; while for the House is
hmst
Nst
= 432USpopst ; where hmst is the number of House representatives
of state s in year t and 432 is the total number of representatives when Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. A
value of 1 means that the state representation is perfectly equal to the national average, while an index above
(below) 1 means overrepresentation (underrepresentation). Table 1 reports state-level averages of this index for
the period 1978-2002.
13The detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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ceptable level. The rather peculiar result of AGHZ concerning the House representation remains
puzzling and should probably only be considered a sampling accident.
Focussing on Senate overrepresentation, the standard procedure amounts to estimating the
following equation:
FEDEXPst = s + t +   SPst 1 + Zst + st; (1)
s = 1; :::48; t = 1978; :::2002;
where FEDEXPst is real per-capita federal expenditure (outlays) in state s at time t, s and
t represent respectively the state and year xed e¤ects, SP stands for senators per capita, and
Zst is a vector of socioeconomic control variables.14
We estimate equation 1 using Census data for the US States during period 1978-2002. Com-
pared to previous studies, this is the longest period ever considered.15 Summary statistics are
reported in table 2. In Table 3, we report our estimates of equation (1). We start with a simple
regression of real federal spending per capita on senators per capita and then progressively
include year dummies, socioeconomic control variables and, nally, state xed e¤ects. Only
the introduction of state xed e¤ects renders the coe¢ cient of senators per capita signicant.
Hence, similarly to AGHZ, we nd that the impact of senators per capita is large and sta-
tistically signicant when state xed e¤ects are included. The magnitudes are also relatively
similar. The signicance of SP , however, disappears if the xed e¤ects are removed.16 Analo-
gously, SP is far from signicant when using the between estimator (column 5). Therefore, the
estimation of the overrepresentation e¤ects relies entirely on the variation of senators percapita
within states over time, while the between variation seems to play no role despite the large
di¤erences of states percapita representation in the Senate.
14A lag occurs between the appropriation of federal funds and the moment when funds are actually spent.
This is relevant when estimating the e¤ect of particular institutional and political variables, since current federal
outlays have normally been appropriated in past budgetary years (Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006). Delays
should therefore be taken into account by introducing lagged values for SP; as well as for any other political
variable, since past policy makers are responsible for current outlays.
15Census data for most spending categories are available starting from 1978, the exceptions being grants
(available from 1977) and procurements and salaries (available only from 1982 onwards). AGHZ use biennial
data from the Almanac of the American politics for some spending outlays starting from 1973, however those
data cannot be matched with census data.
16The same result can be obtained from yearly cross-section regressions. These estimates are not reported
but are available from the authors upon request. These results are consistent with Knight (2004) who also nds
a very modest impact of overrepresentation in cross-section regressions.
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In Table 4 we report the estimates obtained for all the spending aggregates that are available
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, considering specications both with and
without xed e¤ects (but always including year dummies and socioeconomic control variables).
Once again, introducing the state xed e¤ects makes a big di¤erence for the sign and signicance
of senators per capita. For the specication without xed e¤ects, only in the grants equation
the coe¢ cient of senators per capita comes with the expected positive and signicant sign. In
all the other cases, the coe¢ cient has the wrongnegative sign and, in the case of procurement
and defense spending, it is even statistically signicant. When state xed e¤ects are introduced,
the impact of senators per capita becomes positive in all the equations and it is statistically
signicant in the case of direct payments to individuals, salaries and grants. In this last case,
the coe¢ cient has almost been doubled by the introduction of state xed e¤ects. While direct
payments, salaries, and grants are all signicantly explained by the number of senators per
capita, the same does not apply to defense17 and to procurement spending.18 These, however,
are outlays that are at least as likely to be subject to political pressures as direct payments,
salaries, and grants . While the current literature tends always to report xed e¤ects estimates
only, it is worth noting that the results on the e¤ect of overrepresentation are generally not
found in cross-section regressions. Although there are obviously good reasons to include state
xed e¤ects, the fact that the results vanish in cross-section regressions (with the exception of
grants) is rather puzzling.
Finally, we estimate equation (1) without the SP indicator. In this case we expect the e¤ect
of malapportionment to be incorporated in the xed e¤ects. Figure 2 plots the estimated xed
e¤ects versus the average state population (1978-2002).19 The picture is rather di¤erent from
what one would expect if overrepresentation had any sizeable e¤ect. In fact, after controlling
for socioeconomic indicators, larger states appear to receive disproportionately more funds than
smaller states.
Overall this is a rather puzzling picture, from which any denitive conclusion should be
considered very premature. These are, however, the foundations upon which the common
17Our results are di¤erent from AGHZ who nd a signicant impact of senators percapita on defense. If we
run our regression only for the period 1978-1990, we also nd a signicant e¤ect. However, the signicance
disappears in the larger sample.
18Similarly to Hoover and Pecorino (2005) we nd that the coe¢ cient of over-representation in the procure-
ment equation is positive and signicant. This result, however, is not robust to clustering the standard errors
at the state level.
19Using average population is a meaningful exercise since the ranking of the various states in population terms
is relatively stable over the period considered.
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wisdom on the e¤ects of malapportionment is usually based.
3 Reconsidering the basic specication
To cast new lights on the estimation of overrepresentation e¤ect on federal spending, we re-
consider the basic specication used by the existing literature, rewriting the basic equation
(1) as follows (for simplicity we omit the time dummies and the lags in the overrepresentation
indicator and report explicitly the coe¢ cient of the population):
yst
Nst
= s +   2
Nst
+ Nst + 
zst
Nst
+ st; (2)
Now yst is total federal spending in state s at time t, Nst is the total population, zst represents
absolute values of variables that in equation (1) appear instead in per capita and percentage
terms. The overrepresentation indicator is simply given by the number of senators divided by
Nst. If we multiply both sides by Nst we obtain
yst = sNst + 2 + N
2
st + zst +Nstst (3)
In this equation the overrepresentation is captured by the constant term (2). Hence, any
factor that induces a positive constant term in the total spending regression (equation 3) would
be interpreted as overrepresentation in percapita spending regression (equation 2). It is obvious
that the factors that can possibly enter in the constant term are very numerous and there is no
reason to believe that overrepresentation should even be the most relevant of them. Therefore
equation (2), with or without xed e¤ects, cannot identify the impact of overrepresentation on
spending. Moreover, equation (3) imposes a common intercept for all the states (2), while
allowing for a di¤erentiated impact of the population via s: Specication (3) is therefore
appropriate only if we believe that the population is the sole source of state specic variation
in total federal spending. If, as reasonable, we believe that this is not the case, then a better
specication would be one that includes states xed e¤ects (denoted by s):
yst = sNst + 2s + N
2
st + zst +Nstst (4)
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from which our equation of federal spending per-capita would be specied as
yst
Nst
= s + s 
2
Nst
+ Nst + 
zst
Nst
+ st (5)
Like equation (1), equation (5) does not enable us to identify overrepresentation; however, it
allows us to separate the impact of other state-specic factors (s) from the potentially state
specic impact of having di¤erent per capita representation in the senate (s). This point
is very important because from our previous analysis we know that (a) overrepresentation is
only relevant when within state variation is considered and (b) previous studies use the within
regressions to estimate the spending di¤erentials between states due to overrepresentation. The
estimated coe¢ cients in the within regressions capture the relationship between overrepresen-
tation and spending within a state, over time and only if this relationship is the same in each
state, can those coe¢ cients also be used to make comparisons across states. Hence, to estimate
statesspending di¤erentials due to overrepresentation in the xed e¤ects type regressions it is
crucial to verify whether the s coe¢ cients are not statistically di¤erent between states.
The main results from the estimation of equation (5) are easily summarized. First, with a
simple F-test we can formally reject the hypothesis that s =  8s: Moreover, by plotting s
against the average state population (Fig. 3), it is also evident that there is no clear pattern in
their magnitude. Only for grants we nd signicant below-average coe¢ cients for large states,
while for salaries the estimated coe¢ cients (when signicant) are mainly positive and larger
states appear to benet from increases in overrepresentation more than small states. The case
of salaries provides a further clarication of our point: since all the signicant state-specic
coe¢ cients in the salaries equation are positive, it is not surprising to nd that, if we impose
a common  to all states, the resulting estimate would be positive (Table 4, column 8). This
result, however, hides an important heterogeneity in such e¤ects and tells us nothing about the
consequences of malapportionment.
Since the coe¢ cient of senators per capita varies from state to state, between-states com-
parisons that use the aggregate coe¢ cient  can be misleading. One of the most striking
conclusions of AGHZ is that, in 1990, Wyoming received $1148 per-capita more than Califor-
nia due to overrepresentation in the Senate. This magnitude is derived by using the estimated
coe¢ cient b, which is supposed to hold constant across states. Our analysis, however, shows
that the individual s are very di¤erent and therefore can only be used to analyze the evolution
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of spending with respect to senators percapita within a state, over time. This delivers much
smaller magnitudes for changes in the number of senators per capita. More importantly, how-
ever, since the s are di¤erent across states, it makes little sense to interpret b as an estimate
of the impact of overrepresentation: even equalizing the number of senators per capita across
states, and accounting for all the other variables included in the regressions, the di¤erentials in
spending would persist.
4 State-specic trends in federal spending
It is possible to provide a di¤erent and more plausible interpretation of the AGHZ results.
Real federal spending per capita has increased substantially during the period we consider and
displays a clear upward trend. Such trend, however, is also substantially di¤erent from state
to state20 and appears to be highly related to the di¤erent population dynamics. A simple
graphical analysis can illustrate the inverse relationship between spending per capita and state
population quite e¤ectively. We construct an index that represents the ratio between real
spending per capita in each state and average real spending per capita in the total of the 48
states we consider. We x this index to 100 in 1978: hence, an increase in the index above
100 means that the state receives a higher spending share compared to 1978. We construct
an analogous index for the population of each state. The evolution of the spending and of the
population indices over time, reported in Figure 4, shows a remarkable degree of divergence:
an above average increase in population is almost always mirrored by a below average increase
in federal spending per capita. For example, California and Texas are two underrepresented
states with growing population and correspondingly decreasing federal spending per capita.
Pennsylvania and Ohio are also heavily underrepresented, but with a decreasing population:
they display an increase in the federal spending index, i.e. an above average growth in spending.
Coming to the overrepresentated states, Wyoming displays a rather interesting pattern: its
population is growing fast until the mid-eighties, with its share of spending per capita decreasing
20We estimated the state trends for federal outlays percapita over the period 1978-2002. In most states the
trend is positive and signicant at 5% or 1% levels. In ve states only (California, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, and Utah) the estimated trend is not signicant. For states where a positive trend is observed, the
implied growth rate of federal outlays varies considerably, with estimated coe¢ cient values in the range 25.91-
173.18 (with a standard deviation of 45.38). Also, the correlation coe¢ cient between senator per-capita and the
trend variable is almost always bigger than 0.95. The analysis of state trends for other spending variables also
conrms that the various budgetary aggregates follow very di¤erent time patterns across the US states. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
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correspondingly. Once, however, the population of Wyoming decelerates its growth compared
to national average, its share of spending per capita starts increasing. Utah has an increasing
population and a decreasing share of spending. West Virginia, another small state, has instead a
decreasing population and receives increasing shares of spending. Nevada is an overrepresented
state with the fastest growing population in the US: its spending index is constantly below
its even level, although not as much as its population growth would suggests, indicating that
federal spending is somehow adjusted to increasing needs, although not enough to keep the
pace that would be required to maintain a constant index.
These results suggest that the process of federal budget allocation to the states can be well
captured by incrementalist theories (Wildavsky 1964). These posit that the budget in each year
is determined by small-scale marginal changes of past budgetary provisions, since the temporal,
nancial and cognitive resources available in each year do not allow a rigorous re-examination of
the current budget and the possibility to analyze a vast range of alternatives. The consequent
inertia in spending allocation creates disadvantages for states with a fast growing population.
Moreover, according to our analysis, the inverse relationship between spending and population
varies from state to state. This nding is not surprising if one considers the diversity of federal
spending patterns across states. Table 4 summarizes the composition of spending by state
over the period 1982-2002, showing a substantial degree of heterogeneity.21 The inuence that
individual states can exert on federal programs may explain both this heterogeneity as well as
the state-specicity of the coe¢ cient of senators per capita. States enjoy substantial discretion
in promoting outreach or restricting access to welfare programs such as, for example, health
care, unemployment benets or education, that may be fully or partially federally funded.22
Furthermore, state characteristics may themselves require the allocation of federal funds to
spending items that, by formula, adjust di¤erently to population.23 Finally, for some programs,
21For example, while in California, the average share of direct payments to individuals and grants during the
period 1982-2002 amounts to respectively 51% and 17% of the federal budget, in Wyoming, during the same
period, only 35% of federal spending is allocated to direct payments while 26% is spent in the form of grants.
This heterogeneity is also present in the broad sub-categories which include quite di¤erent spending items. For
example, for direct payment to individuals, which represent the largest spending category of the federal budget,
if we consider direct payments other than retirement and social security, the share of spending programs such
as medicare and its subcomponent vary substantially across states.
22For example, on medicaid - which is one of the largest entitlement programs jointly funded by federal and
state goverments - states have discretionarity in increasing access to other groups besides the ones automatically
eligible and in excluding some types of immigrants.
23Productive activities that become state specic, because of physical or technological constraints, may sub-
stantially bias the composition of federal spending toward budget categories that react di¤erently to population
changes. To illustrate the importance of those state-specic spending patterns, it may be worth noting, for
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such as matching grants, where states actively seek to attract federal monies, preferences for
various spending categories as well as ability to secure funds may vary substantially across
states implying that they will not necessarily obtain the same amount of funds even if they face
similar population dynamics. As a consequence, when large spending aggregates are analyzed,
the state specic inverse relationship between spending and population, that appears to have
little to do with overrepresentation as such, may explain why the various s are very di¤erent
from each other.
5 Conclusions
According to a vast empirical literature originated with the seminal work by Atlas et al. (1995),
small states, that are overrepresented in the Congress, are the main beneciaries of federal
largesse. For obvious reasons, this phenomenon is claimed to be particularly strong for the
Senate, where states are represented by the same number of senators independently of their
population size.
In this paper we have reconsidered congressional overrepresentation by focussing on the
econometric specication used in the existing literature. Evidence of small state advantage is
usually found in regressions that include state xed e¤ects, and not in cross sectional studies.
Although including xed e¤ects is crucial to avoid omitted variable problems, an identication
strategy based on within state variation can be problematic, since the dynamics of malappor-
tionment crucially depend on variations in the population size of the various states. These
typically display di¤erent demographic patterns, with expenditure adjusting slowly to such
changes. Using senators per capita as a measure of overrepresentation is equivalent to im-
posing a common intercept in the total federal spending equation. A positive coe¢ cient can
then be interpreted in many ways and the impact of malapportionment remains unidentied.
Moreover, imposing a unique coe¢ cient of senators per capita, i.e. a common intercept in the
total spending equation, represents an inappropriate specication: a simple F-test shows that
the states have di¤erent coe¢ cients of senators per capita. This means that variation in spend-
ing due to overrepresentation can only be compared within a state and not across states. As
example, that in North Dakota agricultural assistance amounts to nearly 70% of direct payments other than
retirement and disability, due to the importance of the agricultural sector in this state, while Virginia, which
is one of the states with the highest concentration of defense investments, displays a record high spending in
salaries mainly due to military personnel.
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a consequence, spending di¤erentials associated with senators percapita would not disappear
even if we could equalize percapita representation in the senate. They have little to do with
malapportionment and must be explained by di¤erent factors related to population dynamics
and other state-specic trending variables. On a more general note, estimates derived from
xed e¤ects regressions should be used with caution when making statements that relate to
variation in the cross-section.
13
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Table 1: Average population, overrepresentation, and spending in the period 1978-2002
state population (millions) Senate overrepresentation
House 
overrepresentation
Federal spending per 
capita (real 1983 
thousands USD)
WY 0.480 10.844 1.205 3.144
VT 0.558 9.305 1.034 2.726
ND 0.651 7.995 0.888 3.807
DE 0.677 7.692 0.855 2.731
SD 0.715 7.254 0.956 3.329
MT 0.836 6.210 1.097 3.340
RI 0.993 5.227 1.162 3.297
ID 1.080 4.838 1.075 2.862
NH 1.082 4.820 1.071 2.673
ME 1.204 4.310 0.958 3.212
NV 1.302 4.376 0.839 2.810
NM 1.553 3.364 1.041 4.437
NE 1.618 3.207 1.069 2.969
UT 1.812 2.904 0.896 2.738
WV 1.851 2.815 1.113 3.020
AR 2.419 2.146 0.954 2.856
KS 2.511 2.066 1.053 3.093
MS 2.639 1.966 1.092 3.249
IA 2.856 1.820 1.126 2.736
OR 2.942 1.772 0.945 2.635
OK 3.235 1.605 1.070 2.975
CT 3.260 1.592 1.061 3.632
CO 3.499 1.499 0.963 3.170
SC 3.523 1.477 0.985 2.897
KY 3.781 1.372 1.004 2.910
AZ 3.805 1.418 0.802 3.046
AL 4.121 1.259 0.979 3.227
LA 4.323 1.201 1.011 2.873
MN 4.439 1.170 1.040 2.617
MD 4.757 1.093 0.972 4.447
WA 4.945 1.060 0.961 3.383
WI 4.977 1.043 1.043 2.375
TN 5.017 1.036 1.013 3.080
MO 5.194 0.999 1.020 3.721
IN 5.671 0.915 1.036 2.440
MA 6.014 0.863 1.032 3.664
VA 6.199 0.840 0.970 4.595
GA 6.663 0.789 0.909 2.795
NC 6.803 0.767 0.971 2.504
NJ 7.826 0.663 1.015 2.793
MI 9.447 0.549 1.059 2.444
OH 10.978 0.473 1.078 2.652
IL 11.711 0.443 1.060 2.561
PA 11.978 0.433 1.084 3.054
FL 12.854 0.412 0.893 3.160
TX 17.447 0.300 0.917 2.695
NY 18.125 0.286 1.071 3.104
CA 29.102 0.180 0.944 3.176
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Population overall 5.20        5.48      0.43 35.12    N =    1200
(in millions) between 5.47      0.48 29.10    n =      48
within 0.81      -1.60 11.21    T =      25
Senate overrepresentation overall 0.97        0.99      0.06 4.71      N =    1200
between 1.00      0.07 4.18      n =      48
within 0.13      0.16 2.25      T =      25
House overrepresentation overall 1.76        0.24      0.92 2.90      N =    1200
between 0.14      1.42 2.09      n =      48
within 0.20      0.96 3.03      T =      25
Federal Spending percapita overall 3.08        0.61      1.79 5.68      N =    1200
between 0.50      2.37 4.60      n =      48
within 0.35      1.53 4.91      T =      25
Direct Payments to individuals overall 1.58        0.33      0.80 3.53      N =    1200
between 0.18      1.12 2.07      n =      48
within 0.28      0.73 3.45      T =      25
Grants overall 0.52        0.17      0.23 1.39      N =    1200
between 0.12      0.34 0.95      n =      48
within 0.12      0.26 1.04      T =      25
Salaries overall 0.41        0.19      0.08 1.38      N =    1008
between 0.19      0.17 1.22      n =      48
within 0.05      0.06 0.57      T =      21
Procurements overall 0.48        0.36      0.09 2.34      N =    1008
between 0.33      0.15 1.58      n =      48
within 0.16      -0.16 1.58      T =      21
Defense overall 0.54        0.36      0.06 2.51      N =    1200
between 0.34      0.11 1.99      n =      48
within 0.15      -0.19 1.33      T =      25
Income overall 13.95 2.52 8.60 24.07 N =    1200
(real 2000 USD) between 1.96 10.33 19.52 n =      48
within 1.61 9.24 18.80 T =      25
% Unemployment overall 5.97 2.11 2.20 18.00 N =    1200
between 1.19 3.58 9.41 n =      48
within 1.75 1.36 15.26 T =      25
% aged above 65 overall 12.26 1.84 7.00 19 N =    1200
between 1.72 8.30 17.9 n =      48
within 0.7 9.77 14.3 T =      25
% in schooling age (5-17) overall 19.39 1.86 1.55 26.58 N =    1200
between 1.36 16.76 24.67 n =      48
within 1.3 16.05 24.74 T =      25
Note. All spending variables and income are expressed in real 2000 USD. For clarity, state
population is reported in millions. However, the coefficients in the regressions refer to this variable
divided by 1,000,000,000,000. Analogously, unemployment, aged and schooling are reported in
percentages here but used as shares in the regressions. All the variables have been taken (or
constructed) from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Table 3: OLS regressions with real federal outlays per capita as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable federal spending federal spending federal spending federal spending federal spending
senators per capita 0.0239 0.0409 0.0186 0.7036 0.0089
(0.40) (0.68) (0.23) (7.69)*** (0.09)
income -0.0022 -0.0786 0.0008
(0.06) (2.33)** (0.01)
share of unemployment -1.4844 0.3875 -2.2027
(0.50) (0.30) (0.29)
state population -12.4005 -67.7994 -12.8143
(1.01) (3.72)*** (0.7)
share aged above 65 -3.1013 10.3895 -4.270599
(0.62) (3.10)*** (0.7)
share in schooling age (5-17) -8.5116 -8.3337 -9.0375
(1.65) (3.33)*** (0.92)
Constant 3.0526 3.6986 5.5007 4.9081 5.5299
(29.67)*** (33.25)*** (2.89)*** (4.31)*** (1.68)
Year Dummies no yes yes yes between est.
State Fixed Effects no no no yes between est.
Observations 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Overall R-squared 0.0016 0.2178 0.2561 0.9177 0.1127
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state (except in column 5). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: OLS regressions with aggregates from the Statistical Abstract
A: without state fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable
direct 
payments to 
individuals 
(1978-2002)
grants       
(1978-2002)
salaries      
(1982-2002)
procurement  
(1982-2002)
defense      
(1978-2002)
senators per capita -0.0018 0.0979 -0.0049 -0.0960 -0.0983
(0.17) (5.23)*** (0.18) (2.85)*** (2.49)**
income -0.0130 0.0021 -0.0152 0.0220 0.0079
(1.87)* (0.31) (1.44) (0.97) (0.31)
share of unemployment 2.6744 1.9982 -2.4802 -1.5815 -4.7857
(5.34)*** (5.04)*** (2.08)** (0.81) (2.23)**
state population -1.6145 3.3834 -3.63 -9.963 -5.7420
(0.94) (1.01) (1.00) (1.23) (0.66)
share aged above 65 7.1531 0.9234 -5.4869 -7.5364 -7.3647
(9.37)*** (1.02) (2.59)** (2.79)*** (2.14)**
share in schooling age (5-17) -4.0966 0.1552 -3.2370 -3.1462 -5.8696
(3.96)*** (0.19) (1.54) (1.21) (1.49)
Constant 1.9254 0.2949 2.0474 2.0715 2.6502
(5.26)*** (1.08) (2.59)** (2.10)** (1.81)*
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects no no no no no
Observations 1200 1200 1008 1008 1200
R-squared 0.8463 0.6617 0.2447 0.2346 0.2456
B: with state fixed effects
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Variable
direct 
payments to 
individuals 
(1978-2002)
grants       
(1978-2002)
salaries      
(1982-2002)
procurement  
(1982-2002)
defense      
(1978-2002)
senators per capita 0.3202 0.1591 0.1235 0.2030 0.0411
(3.50)*** (3.47)*** (3.07)*** (1.81)* (0.75)
income -0.0313 -0.0071 0.0006 -0.0645 -0.0581
(2.73)*** (0.99) (0.12) (1.56) (1.79)*
share of unemployment 1.3605 0.8382 0.0139 -1.5041 -1.9838
(2.45)** (2.93)*** (0.05) (1.17) (1.88)*
state population -44.0607 -9.4037 -20.8916 -27.1538 -22.2525
(3.73)*** (1.65) (4.24)*** (0.98) (1.13)
share aged above 65 5.6735 2.8024 -0.5620 1.2149 -0.0305
(2.39)** (3.37)*** (0.51) (0.29) (0.01)
share in schooling age (5-17) -2.4088 -0.8387 0.0550 -3.5949 -3.4263
(2.38)** (1.55) (0.08) (1.96)* (2.56)**
Constant 2.2716 0.4618 0.4706 1.9188 2.2096
(5.42)*** (2.20)** (2.29)** (1.64) (2.18)**
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1200 1200 1008 1008 1200
R-squared 0.9101 0.9193 0.9635 0.8647 0.8937
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Fig. 1: Real spending per capita and state overrepresentation
Figure 2: Estimated fixed effects (from equations without senators per capita) and average state 
population (1978-2002) 
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Fig. 3: State-specific effects of senators per-capita 
(T-ratios of coefficients are reported in the graphs)  
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Fig. 4: State shares of population and state shares of federal spending (1978=100) 
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Fig. 5: Federal outlays by spending categories (mean shares 1982-2002)
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